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  Abstract  
Since 2015, there have been 8 fatal shootings by the San Francisco Police Department and 
no officers have faced any administrative discipline. This paper works to demonstrate how the San 
Francisco Police Department escapes administrative discipline in situations of officer involved 
shootings (OIS) through the combination of flawed accountability procedures, state laws and 
government leaders who fail to push against these protective forces. My project will show how the 
combination of little authoritative power from the Department of Police Accountability and 
protective state laws in favor of police privacy complicate the investigation procedures that 
determine whether or not officers face accountability for their actions in officer involved 
shootings. Through understanding the history of policing and the legacy of discretionary practices 
in the San Francisco Police Department, we better understand why our civilian oversight agency’s 
implementation into San Francisco police culture has resulted in a non threatening oversight body 
that is operated on nonaggressive policies.  
This project analyzes the 2016 police reform efforts that produced a recommendation 
report and two ballot measures that directly shape the Department of Police Accountability. My 
research shows how these new policies fail to combat the stronger policies and procedures in place 
that contribute to poor DPA officer involved shooting investigations, which typically result in un-
sustained findings. I offer recommendations that directly address the laws and policies that allow 
these institutions to continue to release officers with no sustained findings that result in 
administrative charges.  I will show how the policies pertaining to police accountability in San 
Francisco, although they appear strong on paper, and not upheld within the SFPD and thus 
perpetuate a police culture that allows officers to act with no threat of civilian monitoring.
	  Introduction 
 
As national attention around officer involved shootings (OIS) continues to grow, 
accountability by officers in these instances is still considered a rarity. Attention given to civilian 
deaths by police officers highlights repercussions of communal outrage and raises questions about 
the moments leading up to confrontation between officers and victims. The coverage surrounding 
what happens to officers following these situations often remains undiscussed on national news. 
In recent years, we have seen how a lack of legal accountability by involved officers produces 
mass discussions and protests around police brutality, raising the question: why is it that officers 
face no real discipline for taking life from the communities they’re sworn to protect?  
Moments in history like the 1992 LA protests following the Rodney King trial and the Ferguson 
protests in 2014 following Mike Brown’s trial show how the lack of accountability by law 
enforcement reveals a larger system of inequality, one that does not reprimand police officers for 
the death of communities of color. In both cases of police brutality and others like them, the 
questionable circumstances in which officers act with excessive use of force are investigated by 
oversight agencies and still found to be within compliance of department policies by courts. But 
the frequency in which officers are being let off for these killings all around the country is 
controversial. This trend forces us to question the investigation process and protocols that 
determines if officers face systematic discipline or not. Understanding how OIS cases are 
investigated is necessary in order to understand what legally determines whether officers are held 
accountable for their actions or not. Officer involved shootings are handled in a similar way across 
the nation and questioning ways we handle these tragic situations calls for working at a local level 
	   2	  
by examining how our city contributes to a greater problem. This proves to be a challenge the San 
Francisco local community.  
On a local radar, the San Francisco Police Department stirred communal attention around 
their high rates of OIS and low record of officers facing either criminal or administrative discipline 
for their actions. According to police data, between 2000 and 2015 there were 95 reported 
shootings involving SFPD, including 40 fatal ones.1 Between 2015 to 2017, six people have been 
killed by SFPD, the highest count in more than 15 years, and of these cases, no officers have faced 
criminal or administrative discipline. Each of these shootings took place in either the Mission or 
Bayview district, calling attention to the role race plays into OIS as white officers are not 
reprimanded for killing people of color. When we talk about police brutality in San Francisco, 
familiar names like Alex Nieto, Mario Woods and Jessica Williams come up when discussing what 
reform is necessary for SFPD to reduce its body count. These victims, along with others and the 
exception of Alex Nieto, are examples of men and women who were shot under questionable 
circumstances that require intensive investigation that’s yet to be concluded. This high level of 
OIS frequency by the San Francisco Police Department is upsetting, but the lack of accountability 
for each case also proves to be just as alarming because it shows how a normalized lack of overall 
monitoring on officer conduct perpetuates a cycle of continued violence and distrust between 
community and law enforcement.   
Officer involved shootings are an ugly reality for police departments, but their occurrences 
are a separate project that would look at use of force protocols and officer training methods. My 
project follows the process of what happens after an officer involved shooting takes place. There 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Joaquin Palomino, “SF’s police-involved shootings: practices and patterns,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, May 22, 2016, http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/SF-s-police-involved-
shootings-practices-and-7921829.php.	  
	   3	  
are two San Francisco agencies responsible for investigations of officer misconduct, including 
officer involved shootings. They are the District Attorney’s Office and the Department of Police 
Accountability (DPA), once known as the Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC). The District 
Attorney’s Office is responsible for filing criminal charges against police officers while the 
Department of Police Accountability offers administrative discipline in a complex indirect way. 
The focus of my project examines the roles and limitations of the Department of Police 
Accountability in their investigative authority over officer involved shootings.  
In effort to change local approval of the San Francisco Police Department, the Police 
Commission initiated a reform during 2016 that would change leaders and policies used to direct 
the overall culture of the SFPD. These changes, as I’ll discuss later in my project, range from 
hiring a new Chief of Police to updating outdated use of force policies that determine when and 
how inflicting violence on civilians is appropriate. Through a combination of local elections and 
Police Commission appointments, the reform effort changed the powers of the DPA and their 
authoritative role in officer involved shooting cases. The installment of Proposition D now requires 
the DPA to investigate any incident in which an officer fires a gun and kills or injures someone. 
The DPA may now initiate OIS investigations as soon as they occur, which makes chances of 
finding substantial evidence higher and more useful in supporting administrative charges against 
officers. Although overall reform efforts aimed to give more power to the DPA, none of the 
proposed legislations address the actual charter structure determining how the Department of 
Police Accountability is allowed to administer discipline. The SFPD reform effort of 2016 proved 
there was an attempt to better the policing system but as my paper will show, many of these 
changes around the DPA fail to tackle the real roadblocks the agency faces in their attempt to 
charge officers with administrative discipline. 
	   4	  
In the death of Alex Nieto, a local San Francisco resident shot by SFPD, laws governing 
how the then OCC determined the findings of the case proved limiting, making it difficult for OCC 
investigators to offer any substantial information to convict officers of acting outside policy. Alex 
Nieto’s death was adopted by the local community and transformed into a movement that called 
for the accountability of the four officers responsible for shooting at Alex 58 times in the span of 
less than 30 seconds. The then OCC’s inability to produce an investigation that challenged officer 
proceedings and behavior in the case of Alex’s death was a low point in the local community’s 
confidence in the civilian oversight agency, calling into question whether or not the protective 
body really does have say over who is allowed to patrol the streets. My project questions the 
existing policies that protect police officers from administrative discipline in cases of officer 
involved shootings. I investigate whether existing policy helps the Department of Police 
Accountability (DPA) promote effective administrative discipline, and I explore ways to make the 
DPA more effective in administering discipline. Examining the new policies of the 2016 reform, 
I argue that these new laws, although making strong attempt at reform, do not address the major 
state laws and key local policies and charter structures that protect officers from thorough OIS 
investigations. The reforms do not allow the DPA to fully administer discipline, keeping the DPA 
ineffective and largely unable to hold officers accountable. I later offer recommendations that 
would strengthen the DPA’s capacity to develop real oversight and to hold officers accountable 
for their role in officer involved shootings.  
 First, the paper assesses the historical context of policing in America, specifically looking 
at the San Francisco Police Department. Then, the paper looks at the background of civilian 
oversight agencies’ emergence in modern policing. This paper assesses the San Francisco 
Department of Police Accountability and their role in the city’s Police Department structure. I 
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examine the current DPA complaint process and show how in the case of Alex Nieto, the DPA 
investigation failed the mission of the civilian oversight agency, showing how the current system 
we have does not work. Then, my paper analyzes the 2016 reform efforts related to the Department 
of Police Accountability to show how the reforms do not address the limitations the DPA faces in 
situations of OIS investigations. I then offer recommendations that directly address these 
limitations; these recommendations directly address the Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights, Copley v. 
Supreme Court and the City and County of San Francisco’s charter. I offer recommendations on 
how to better the structure of the SF charter that determines how the DPA is allowed to administer 
discipline to police officers.  
 
Research Methodology and Approach  
 
The primary research method I used to over the course of my research was participant 
observation. My goal was to fully understand the current policing system we have in San Francisco 
by developing a solid understanding of communal and agency representative attitudes towards the 
police given the political climate of today. I made an effort to attend community gatherings around 
the latest issues of officer involved shootings, such as protests for Mothers on the March Against 
Police Murders and protest rallies for the deaths of Luis Gongorra and Alex Nieto. Through these 
experiences, I was able to meet the families of the latest OIS victims and the community organizers 
working to obtain justice through the criminal justice system. Meeting the people who are directly 
effected by this policing crisis helped me ground my research in a heartfelt place that recognizes 
what this project discusses has real life implications for San Francisco communities. In attempt to 
develop a well rounded understanding of how policing is handled in San Francisco, I also attended 
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different open Police Commission meetings to witness the organization in action, and observe how 
decisions are evaluated and talked about. By immersing myself as much as possible in a city wide 
discussion, I gained a first hand account of how severe this topic really is for the city of San 
Francisco.  
A major research method I used over the course of my research project was conducting 
one-on-one interviews with policing experts and SF Police Department officials to learn more 
information on the inner workings of the large organization. I was able to connect the different 
narratives of key players involved to create a better understanding of the relationships between 
government agencies that are involved during instances of officer involved shootings. I was 
fortunate enough to meet with representatives from the Department of Police Accountability, the 
Police Commission, and the Police Officer’s Association, as well as other community experts in 
civilian oversight and police brutality.  
Through the relationships I developed with different organizers involved with SFPD officer 
involved shootings, I was able to gain better insight on the inner workings of the Department of 
Police Accountability. I spent much of my research time looking through openness reports, 
evaluating public letters from the DPA and reading various articles written about the organization. 
I used current events stories and local publications to gather information on the DPA and its 
executive director. I did this in order to develop a “real life” understanding of what San Francisco 
residents really thought about to DPA, in order to determine in what ways can we better the 
organization to gain respect in the eyes of the people it serves. 
I worked to understand the structural authority in officer involved shootings that comes 
from the Department of Police Accountability and the Police Commission by reading through the 
San Francisco charter. A large amount of my information came from evaluating and reading 
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through the three major external investigations on the SFPD from 2016. This was a major research 
component of my project, these reports are: 
1. “Into the Open: Opportunities for More Timely and Transparent Investigations of Fatal San 
Francisco Police Department Officer-Involved Shootings” by the Civil Grand Jury, 2012-
2016 
2. “Report of The Blue Ribbon Panel on Transparency, Accountability, and Fairness in Law 
Enforcement” by The Blue Ribbon Panel, selected by the District Attorney of San 
Francisco, George Gascon.  
3. “Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the San Francisco Police Department” 
by Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), U.S Department of Justice 
These research initiatives all provide important information on the state of practices used by the 
SFPD that were in need of review. Understanding the findings on officer involved shooting 
protocols allowed me draw connections to the recent reform measures of 2016 and ultimately 
helped me determine what works for the Department of Police Accountability and what does not 
. 
I. Background: Policing in America and Policing in SF  
 
This section focuses on the foundational roots of American policing and discusses the 
legacies this model has instilled in the San Francisco Police Department. Then, I discuss the rise 
of civilian oversight agencies and what their presence meant for police bodies and issues of 
misconduct. Modern American policing is rooted in a history of white supremacy, as it followed 
the development of policing in England to serve as criminal regulation for growing urbanization. 
In the article “Policing and Oppression Have a Long History,” Stephen L. Carter discuses these 
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historical roots of continuing mistrust between law enforcement and communities of color. Carter 
explains that in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, most Northern communities used a night 
watch system, adopted from England, to keep order in the mixed race communities they watched.2 
The night watchman system required watchmen to stay at their posts and summoned watchmen 
only when a crime occurred. Carter says, “As late as the early 19th century, law enforcement 
remained largely in the hands of citizens, who would band together to pursue miscreants. Unified 
police departments were not formed in Northern cities until the gang wars of the 1840s created the 
necessity.”3 Slave patrollers, by contrast was a similar system that existed throughout the South. 
Slave patrols or “paterollers,” were remembered for tracking down runaway slaves and ferreting 
out potential uprisings. Immigrants in the North saw the police as an institution created to keep 
them in their place, the same way black Southerners viewed slave patrols. Carter argues these slave 
patrols provided the template for contemporary policing, whereas when the Northern police forces 
finally began to grow, they were organized on the model pioneered by the South.4  
The growth of cities necessitated the development of local centralized, bureaucratic police 
forces. As Dr. Gary Potter argues in his essay “The History of Policing in the United States,” it 
was the growth of cities and pace of urbanization that old informal watch system could no longer 
be considered adequate for controlling social disorder.5 This shift of racial demographics 
concentrating in urban centers fueled the belief that increasing crime would take place at higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Stephen L. Carter, “Policing and Oppression Have a Long History,” Bloomberg View, October 
29, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-29/policing-and-oppression-have-
a-long-history.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Dr. Gary Potter, “The History of Policing in the United States, Part 1,” Eastern Kentucky 
University, June 25, 2013, http://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-
1.	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rates and for that reason, police departments were thought of as necessary to control to social moral 
of cities.  
The beginning of the professionalization of the police began during the American 
Progressive Era, with the establishment of formal training, police academies and the incorporation 
of management politics. In Christopher Lowen Agee’s book The Streets of San Francisco, Agee 
discusses the emergence of urban police departments following World War II period as products 
on an earlier machine-politics era.6 According to Agee, police reformers attempted to introduce 
military models to law enforcement during the early twentieth century, but the urban police 
departments of the late 1940s retained many of the same principles of the first forces of the mid 
nineteenth century.7 In San Francisco, the national understanding of community policing was 
adopted by the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD). Agee argues, it was the machine 
politicians of San Francisco that expected the police department to act as the “electioning arm” of 
the machine, by appointing loyal police officers to powerful managerial positions and encouraging 
officers to maintain their autonomy from City Hall. 8 Agee says, “as a result, officials cultivated a 
decentralized bureaucratic police arrangement in which authority over policy (and with it the 
authority to make decisions regarding graft) resided with district station captains and the chief of 
inspectors, not with the chief of police.”9 At the same time, city officials allowed police officers 
to determine for themselves how and when to enforce law, creating a historic department culture 
that practiced autonomous discretionary policing. Agee shows in his text, the ways in which 
throughout San Francisco history discretionary policing resulted in the criminalization of people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Christopher Lowen Agee, “Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a 
Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950-1972,” The University of Chicago Press, 2014.	  	  	  
7	  Ibid.,	  8.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  8.	  	  
9	  Ibid.,	  9.	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of color, activists, and gay communities on a day-to-day basis by a largely all-white, all-Catholic, 
all-male police force.10 
	  
The Role of Civilian Oversight Agencies 
	  
Civilian oversight bodies emerged in large cities during the middle of the 20th century. 
According to a report by the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement 
titled Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, between the 1920s and the 1960s, early efforts at 
establishing modern oversight to combat lawlessness in law enforcement came about.11 The first 
wave of civilian oversight agencies were organized around volunteer boards that reviewed 
complaints and completed internal police investigations of community complaints filed against 
officers. The basic idea of civilian groups holding officers accountable to follow local law 
enforcement’s own high standards of conduct has remained the foundation of oversight agencies 
all these years later. Decades of change and innovation have propelled this idea forward into what 
they are today, but at their foundation oversight agencies’ main purpose was to reinforce and 
uphold accountability through a review board model.  
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement presents a history of the emergence of civilian 
oversight agencies in police structures, breaking down types of systemic oversight models as they 
form through decades. In the middle of the 20th century, oversight mechanisms were strongly 
influenced by the civil rights movements emerging throughout the country and other local crises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Ibid., 9. 
11 Joseph Angelis, Richard Rosenthal, Brian Buchner, “Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: 
A Review of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models”, National Association for 
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, September 2016.	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that came from police misuse of force in communities of color.12 Between 1970s-1980s, in the 
emergence of the second wave of oversight agencies following years of innovative thought on how 
to improve civilian oversight, the agencies grew stronger in their resources, durability and 
expanded what they could do in their organizational authority.13 For example, oversight agencies 
in their second wave were given the power to conduct investigations for received complaints that 
were independent of the police.  In Berkeley, CA 1973, a city ordinance created the Police Review 
Commission (PRC), creating the first agency with the ability to independently investigate 
complaints filed by members of the public against police officers. The independent, investigative 
authority is what made the second wave of oversight agencies stronger because it created a method 
of accountability that involved citizen testimony against word of the police. 
According to Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, the third wave of development began 
in the 1990s as the expansion of police oversight agencies spread throughout the country. This 
third wave saw the emergence of the auditor/monitor model which unlike the other models of 
oversight that relied on review and investigation of individual complaints, the new auditor/monitor 
model had the authority to conduct broad pattern evaluations in order to offer data driven 
recommendations for improving police policies, practices and training. Key strengths of the 
auditor/monitor model of oversight are that this model has a more robust reporting practice than 
other forms of oversight and are generally less expensive than full investigative agencies, but more 
expensive than review focused agencies.14 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ibid., 4.  
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Ibid., 11.	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II. The Department of Police Accountability: History  
 
 In this section, I present a contextual description of the San Francisco Department of Police 
Accountability. I also describe their jurisdiction in investigations regarding officer involved 
shootings and their shortcomings as an organization. San Francisco’s civilian oversight agency, 
the Department of Police Accountability aims to reaffirm all local citizens’ concerns regarding 
police behavior. The Department of Police Accountability (DPA), originally known as the Office 
of Citizen Complaints (OCC) is an independent civilian oversight agency that acts as an extra pair 
of eyes to the Police Commission to review complaints of police misconduct.15 The DPA exists to 
investigate citizen filed complaints against SFPD officers. Complaints are filed with the DPA 
when anyone feels a member of the Police Department has acted improperly in the course of their 
work. This can include discourteous treatment, unjustified arrests, unnecessary force and in some 
cases lethal use of force. The DPA offers discipline recommendations to the chief of police when 
reinforcing evidence shows officers acted outside of police policies; the agency’s powers include 
authority to submit administrative charges against officers directly to the Police Commission if the 
Chief of Police refuses to administer discipline the DPA Director feels is necessary. The 
Department of Police Accountability’s mission statement affirms the agency’s commitment to, 
“promptly, fairly, and impartially investigate complaints against San Francisco police officers, 
make policy recommendations regarding police practices and conduct periodic audits of the San 
Francisco Police Department.”16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The Office of Citizen Complaints, The Office of Citizen Complaints Pamphlet: an agency 
reporting to the San Francisco Police Commission. (San Francisco: OCC).  
16 “About Us,” Department of Police Accountability, Accessed March 29, 2016, 
http://sfgov.org/occ/.	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The Department of Police Accountability, originally called the Office of Citizen 
Complaints, was created as a separate city department by an amendment to the San Francisco City 
Charter (section 4.127) in 1982 and placed under direct supervision of the Police Commission.17 
In an interview, Barbara Attard, a Bay Area based civilian oversight expert and former OCC 
employee, described the history of the OCC’s origins as coming from a unity between San 
Francisco coalitions that faced regular, un-denounced mistreatment from police officers. 
According to Attard’s historical account, in late 70s early 80s, Black and Latino groups 
independently organized around police brutality issues they each faced but it wasn’t until two 
separate events occurred that brought police misconduct to the forefront to the minds of white and 
gay communities in the city.18 In 1978, the murder of Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor 
Harvey Milk by fellow Supervisor Dan White, an ex police officer, sparked community outrage 
over how the murder case was handled by the police department. Dan White resigned from his 
position on the Board of Supervisor and following his resignation, his police department supporters 
advised him to change his mind. White asked Mayor Moscone to rescind his resignation but when 
the mayor turned down his request, White retaliated and murdered Moscone and Supervisor 
Harvey Milk. This was a devastating moment for the City of San Francisco, especially the gay 
community, which mourned the loss of a major political icon. Attard says the case against Dan 
White was not investigated well by the police department and on May 21, 1979, he was found 
guilty of only voluntary manslaughter instead of first-degree murder.19 White was sentenced to a 
maximum of seven years in prison, outraging the city’s gay community. This demonstration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Ibid.  
18 Barbara Attard (former OCC employee), interview by Sofia Aguilar in San Francisco, March 
3, 2017.  
19 Ibid.	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public anger became known as the “White Night Riots,” a series of protests and public 
demonstrations streaming from the Castro District to Civic Center. During these demonstrations, 
violence erupted during demonstrations between participants and SFPD. Police used heavy 
amounts of excessive force against protestors in front of City Hall, perpetuating community 
concern over police behavior.  
According to Attard, the Super Bowl victory of 1982 was the second event that sparked 
communal demand for police oversight.20 After the San Francisco 49ers victory in 1982 Super 
Bowl, a celebratory parade commenced in the streets. The parade crowds estimated well over 
500,000 people attended the parade but following the celebration, there was a high amount of 
complaints against officers using unnecessary excessive force against rowdy locals. These two 
moments in San Francisco history would pave the road for police reformers to create a plan that 
could inspire hope for the people of San Francisco concerned with police misconduct.  
These two events commenced a broader coalition of diverse groups, all wanting stronger 
civilian oversight over SFPD. Leading up to the local election in November 1982, Supervisor 
Harry Britt spearheaded the campaign for a ballot measure that would create the Office of Citizen 
Complaints, a civilian oversight agency that would monitor the behavior of SFPD that minority 
groups had been concerned about for years. The ballot measure won with overwhelming support 
and the following year, the Office of Citizen Complaints was implemented into San Francisco 
government. According to Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, the Office of Citizen Complaints 
completely replaced the police internal affairs function in relation to citizen complaints and was 
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granted the authority to both receive and investigate all citizen complaints, while the police 
department continued to investigate internally-generated complaints against officers.21 
 
The Department of Police Accountability: How It Operates  
 
Under the San Francisco charter amendment, the Department of Police Accountability was 
placed under direct supervision of the Police Commission. The Police Commission is a volunteer 
civilian body of seven members; four members are nominated by the mayor and three members 
are nominated by the Board of Supervisors. Because the DPA operates under the structure of the 
Police Commission, the Police Commission has the power to appoint the director of the DPA, 
subject to approval by the mayor and the Board of Supervisors.22 This also means the Police 
Commission holds the power to terminate the services of the DPA’s director. The director of the 
DPA is required to attend the Police Commission’s weekly meetings and is also responsible for 
overseeing the investigations of the agency and reporting findings and recommendations to the 
chief of police or the Police Commission when there’s a disagreement between the DPA director 
and the chief over findings. By Charter, the Police Commission holds the power to manage, 
organize and reorganize the DPA and in practice, these powers are generally carried out by the 
Police Commission through the DPA Director.  
On paper, the San Francisco Department of Police Accountability has one of the strongest 
investigative models of oversight in the country. A DPA investigation begins with complaint 
intake, which initiates investigation and calls for findings on civilian complaints of on-duty 
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misconduct by sworn members of the San Francisco Police Department. Overview of Civilian 
Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States by Barbara Attard and Kathryn Olson analyzes 
the investigative model that the San Francisco Department of Police Accountability is modeled 
after. According to Attard and Olson, agencies that have a community board or commission as the 
adjudicatory body, the civilian staff typically conducts fact-finding investigations and hearings 
that are held before the commission or review board to determine findings.23 They describe, “The 
investigative model process follows the tasks of classifying complaints, framing the misconduct 
issues by delineating allegations, identifying witnesses to be interviewed and questioned and then 
determining relevant evidence for further review.”24 The importance of agency independence is 
significant in this investigation process because as Attard and Olson suggest, witnesses may be 
more willing to be involved in an investigation if it is conducted separate from the law enforcement 
agency. In many instances, civilians are reluctant to work with oversight agencies out of fear of 
retaliation from law enforcement. 
Independence is one of many components that create a successful oversight agency. 
Successful oversight bodies require independence from special interest groups, police, and elected 
and other government officials.25 Independence promotes faith from the community and law 
enforcement alike, in trusting that the oversight agency with conduct itself in a fair and unbiased 
manner. Independence within the investigation and conclusion processes allows for uncensored 
and non-controlled findings that are not determined to favor any specific side, allowing the 
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empowerment of the oversight agency to make independent judgments about cases and policy 
issues without fear of reprisal.  
Attard and Olson suggest there also needs to be a strong form of political will to support 
independent oversight. Strong political will comes from politicians and those in power who are 
willing to listen to the findings of oversight agencies and address the most pressing problems in 
law enforcement that agencies bring to light. Government officials with strong political will uphold 
the foundational intention of oversight agencies as existing as an accountability mechanism.26 The 
Department of Police Accountabilities most recent director Joyce Hicks has been in charge of the 
oversight agency for the last nine years, making her the one of the longest serving heads in 
department history. Before Hicks was department head, she had experience serving as Deputy 
Director of the Oakland Citizens Review Board, where she also served as director for four years. 
During her time as San Francisco DPA director, Hicks has received heavy criticisms from civilians 
as well as internal staff concerning her lack of a firm fist around filing sustained findings with the 
Police Commission if the the Chief of Police disagrees. Joyce Hicks announced her retirement 
from her Executive Director position in April 2017.27 This newfound search for department 
director by the Police Commission will need to consider  indications of strength by demonstrations 
of political will in potential director candidates. 
Oversight agencies must have adequate funding and spending authority in order to hire an 
adequate amount of skilled staff to complete thorough and effective investigations. Staff must be 
able to analyze investigations and prepare documents in a timely manner for reports, appeals, 
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public disclosure, litigation, and other purposes.28 The Collaborative Reform Initiative: An 
Assessment of the San Francisco Police Department outlined a breakdown of DPA budget in 
correlation with staffing. In San Francisco, the DPA’s approved budget for fiscal year 2015-2016 
was $5,562,081.29 In an interview, Executive Director Joyce Hicks said “The DPA has strong 
jurisdiction but has never been funded in a way that satisfies it’s mission.”30 Hicks alluded to the 
ways in which budgeting directly effects the DPA’s staffing, raising the point that for all the 
responsibilities the DPA is tasked with, the amount of investigators and attorneys should be 
sufficient enough to handle its workload without a shortage of support that’s needed for the data 
riven agency.31 
Staffing for DPA is established by city charter, requiring the DPA to consist of no less than 
one line investigator for every 150 sworn SFPD members.32 According to the City Charter, the 
police staffing minimum threshold is 1,971 officers.33 According to the DPA’s 2016 Second 
Quarter Statistical Report, the DPA’s budget provides for 18 line investigators, four senior 
investigators, and a deputy director/chief of investigations.34 By the close of the second quarter, 
18 employees staffed the 23 investigator positions, making the agency technically where it needs 
to be in terms staffing. Depending on the frequency of filled complaints with the DPA, the success 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid., 8.  
29 COPS Office, “Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the San Francisco Police 
Department” U.S Department of Justice, October 2016.	  	  
30	  Joyce Hicks (Department of Police Accountability Director), interview by Sofia Aguilar in San 
Francisco, March 7, 2017.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 130. 
33 Ibid., 130.	  	  
34	  Department of Police Accountability, “Office of Citizen Complaints 2016 Second Quarter 
Statistical Report,” City and County of San Francisco, August 10, 2016, 
http://sfgov.org/occ/sites/default/files/OCC_2Q16.pdf.	  	  
	   19	  
of the agency’s investigative finding lies in its adequate staff and access to the materials and 
information needed to carry out their duties.                    
Civilian oversight was an adjustment to the SF police culture built on a legacy of 
discretionary force practices and separatism from City Hall regulation. The DPA director and the 
Police Officers Association, the union that represents and protects members in all officer 
investigations, have a difficult relationship. Since the DPA’s purpose is to determine whether or 
not officers should be charged if they’ve acted in misconduct, the police chief and the POA often 
fight with the DPA director over discipline recommendations. The police chief is often reluctant 
to impose discipline on his officers, having full backing by the POA not to. Policies have been 
created to combat these poor relationships from getting in the way of rightful discipline. A report 
by SPUR gives the history of city policies aimed to combat these police tensions with an external 
regulation agency. For example in 2003, Proposition H was put on the ballot by the Board of 
Supervisors in attempts to collect more power for the DPA, a necessity spurred from a history of 
non-cooperation by the police department.35 Prop. H allowed the Office of Citizen Complaints to 
file disciplinary charges with the Police Commission, subject to limitation but at the time was a 
power that was solely vested in the police chief, giving the agency more authority and 
independence in fulfilling effective oversight. The measure also expanded the size of the Police 
Commission from five to seven members, creating a bigger panel of city wide leaders to help 
regulate the police department. This measure finally gave the DPA the administrative leverage it 
needed, to file disciplinary charges directly to the Police Commission, which by their decision can 
determine appropriate discipline level, such as retraining, suspension or termination.  
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 In an effort to maintain open and transparent communication with the general public, the 
Department of Police Accountability publishes “openness reports,” which give general 
information about the types of complaints received that quarter and the findings of each complaint 
following the completion of each investigation. In these openness reports, the officers and 
complainants are not named. California law protects the confidentiality of peace officer personnel 
records as I will discuss later in my paper. Observing the trends of the recent years in openness 
reports, there is a large percentage of the reports that have inconclusive findings. A total of 14 
cases were sustained in the second quarter of 2016, a 10% sustained rate, combined with 17 
sustained cases in the first quarter of 2016, a 10% sustained rate.36 There have been no sustained 
findings in investigations of complaints against officer involved shootings in recent history by the 
Department of Police Accountability.  
 
The Department of Police Accountability: The Complaint Process 
 
This section of the paper shows the ways in which the Department of Police Accountability 
complaint process for cases of officer misconduct is a major source of work for the department but 
arguably the most important aspect of the DPA to understand. This process is where investigators 
have the authority to look into filed complaints, evaluate evidence and interview witnesses 
involved with the situation to determine what will administratively happen to an officer.  
 Through the DPA complaint process, every initiated investigation on officer misconduct 
has the potential to reveal evidence against officers that proves whether officers act outside of 
policy. Appendix A shows a detailed graphic of the DPA complaint process, including key players 
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and general information of where the cases go to.37 DPA intervention begins with a complaint that 
should be filed when a citizen feels that a member of SFPD acted improperly. These complaint 
reasons range from discourteous treatment, failure to take action, unnecessary force etc. After 
complaint intake, the case may either go to a mediation program, which allows complainants to 
resolve their issues with the accused officer in a face-to-face resolution setting, or the case will go 
into investigation. In a DPA investigation, there are a series of interviews that happen between the 
complainant, the officer(s), and witnesses. The investigators are responsible for reviewing relevant 
Police Department records, policies, and procedures, while offering applying legal analysis to the 
situation. The investigator then compiles their findings and presents them to the senior investigator 
and the deputy director so that this team may ensure accuracy and consistency in the findings that 
are within Police Commission standards. This report is then reviewed by the DPA director, who 
decides what action to take. Then they send preliminary disposition letters to both complainant 
and the accused officer. The three decisions to be made around complaints following investigation 
are: (1) Sustained, (2) Not Policy, or (3) Training Failure.38 
The second half of complaint procedure is complex. If and when the DPA director 
determines the complaint findings as “sustained,” they then have authority to file these findings 
with the Police Chief. There are 5 proceedings that can occur from this meeting, they are the 
following: 
• (1): The DPA Director recommends discipline level 
• (2): The Police Chief determines discipline level up to 10 days’ suspension 
• (3): The Police Chief can decline to impose discipline. The case concludes 
• (4): The DPA Director recommendation that on Chief’s behalf OCC files charges with the 
Police Commission  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Appendix A	  
38	  See Appendix A.	  	  
	   22	  
• (5) If the Police Chief disagrees (with #4), the DPA Director can directly file charges with 
Police Commission.  
Proceedings 2 and 3 put authority in the hands of the police chief to determine discipline of 
officers. It is important to note that following discipline, the accused officer has the right to request 
a chief’s hearing in which they can challenge the police chief and the DPA’s prosecution, which 
afterwards he or she may still appeal to the Police Commission. Looking at steps 4 and 5, charges 
are then filed with the Police Commission, which has the authority to make a decision on both 
officer appeals from the chief’s level discipline and determine discipline greater than 10-days 
suspension and up to termination.  
In regards to this complaint process, the Department of Police Accountability deals with 
criticisms over whether this process makes it easy or not for the chief of police to disregard 
recommended discipline. I argue there is conflict that comes from a disciplinary department that 
is only authorized to recommend discipline if there are sustained findings of an officers’ 
misconduct. This structure by charter makes it so that discipline is dependent on how aggressive 
the Department of Police Accountability director is. As openness reports have shown, very rarely 
does the current director challenge the chief of police by actually bringing sustained charges to the 
Police Commission. This process also shows how discipline is really left to the chief of police’s 
discretion.  
As my paper demonstrates, blame does not completely fall on the DPA for its lack of 
effectiveness. Many people don’t understand the structural limitations that the DPA faces when 
attempting to investigate misconduct complaints. A better understanding of limitations as to what 
the DPA can and cannot do helps us realize the hurdles DPA faces and better informs us on how 
we can work to properly address these power structure and laws that guide them.  
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Department of Police Accountability: Officer Involved Shooting Investigations  
 
The DPA’s complaint process for cases of misconduct remains almost the same as its 
investigations of complaints of officer involved shootings. According to the DPA’s 2016 Second 
Quarter Statistical Report, there are four officer involved shooting complaints that remain open at 
the end of the second quarter 2016. The DPA is still investigating the complaints around the deaths 
of Luis Gongora, Jessica Williams, Amilcar Perez-Lopez and Mario Woods.39 In San Francisco, 
community demonstrations demanding justice for these deaths puts a heavy pressure on the DPA 
to justly investigate these OIS cases, but what are the protocols that determine how the DPA can 
“justly” investigate these incidents? Justice coalitions and local police reform advocates demand 
investigations that produce findings that determine the involved officers did not act within SFPD 
policy for killing the civilians the ways they did. Despite these heavy community pressures, the 
DPA has a poor history of producing sustained findings that show officers acted wrongly in OIS. 
Understanding the structural and legal limitations the DPA faces in its investigation process helps 
us better understand why it is the DPA’s findings in these cases rarely lead to serious administrative 
discipline for SFPD officers.  
Officer involved shooting cases are followed by two separate but congruent investigations; 
they are criminal and administrative investigations. The DPA is responsible for administrative 
investigations, which are conducted to determine whether officers involved violated any SFPD 
policy or procedure during the shooting.40 The 2016 Civil Grand Jury report “Into the Open” 
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summarizes the DPA research focus during their investigations to ask: “Did the officers act in 
accordance with SFPD policy and procedure and use appropriate law enforcement tactics under 
the circumstances or should the officers be disciplined, retrained or fired because of their 
actions?”41 In recent high profile cases of San Francisco OIS, most would argue these cases are 
all similar in that they share questionable circumstances under which officers discharged their 
weapons. In the Mario Woods case for example, there is video evidence showing five officers 
surrounding an African American man holding a knife, moments before they shot as many as 15 
rounds on him, killing Woods on the spot. This case outraged San Francisco community members 
and raised questions around how five armed officers could fear for their lives against one man who 
may have been mentally ill. In an OIS case like the Woods example, the DPA is responsible for 
showing a preponderance of evidence that proves officers acted improperly. Before the June 2016 
charter amendment that now allows the DPA to launch their own investigations on OIS, the DPA 
conducted their own independent administrative investigations in the following way: (1) sending 
their own department investigators to the OIS scene to observe; (2) conducting an independent 
review and analysis of evidence it received from the SFPD Homicide Detail, who originally 
collects it; and (3) performing any additional investigative tasks and interviews that it deems 
necessary to conduct thorough investigations of the incident.42  
The division in criminal and administrative investigations is because, as the Civil Grand 
Jury report explains, “while police officers receive due process protections and Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination as subjects of a criminal investigation, along with specific 
protections under the Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights, police officers can be compelled by their 
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employer to make a “statement against interests” as subjects on an administrative investigation.”43 
Therefore, it’s necessary for involved investigatory bodies to maintain a “one-way flow” of 
information. This means investigators from administrative investigations like the DPA must 
receive all of their evidence and information from the criminal investigation while the criminal 
investigation can receive no information from the administrative investigations. An administrative 
investigation can not be concluded and no disciplinary proceedings can happen until the criminal 
investigation is completed and the DA’s Office has issued its charging decision letter.  
The DPA protocol for evidence collection in OIS is damaging to the investigations they 
produce. As a government body with responsibility to investigate misconduct, the DPA has been 
given a major opportunity to change the way it is perceived by the greater community, dependent 
on how aggressive they will be in their newfound authority to investigate officer involved 
shootings. But so long as this protocol around how evidence is gathered remains the same, I argue 
that OIS investigations will continue to produce no sustained findings that uphold accountability 
in OIS cases. I will specifically focus on how the DPA was involved with the Alex Nieto case and 
then examine what the Alex Nieto case reveals about this investigation process. 
	  
 
III. Missing the Mark: The DPA’s findings on the Alex Nieto case  
 
This section of my project presents a recent example of how an officer involved shooting 
investigation by the Department of Police Accountability failed in it’s investigation to include 
critical evidence information that would have produced different administrative outcomes for the 
police officers involved. I discuss how the death of Alex Nieto revealed the structural limitations 
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that the Department of Police Accountability faces in OIS investigations. In the case of OIS 
incidents that the Department of Police Accountability investigates, the information on findings to 
the cases are very difficult to locate publically. Only by poring through a series of “openness 
reports” on the DPA website can summaries of OIS investigations be found but even then, the 
summaries were vague so as not to reveal the identities of individuals shot or the SFPD officers 
involved. I present the situational context of the Nieto case in order to show how the DPA’s 
openness report ultimately failed to capture the side of the story that would have changed the 
course of the verdict. The Nieto movement demanded accountability from the police department 
responsible for the loss of a young man who died in an unjustifiable way in the eyes of his 
community.  
 
Justice and Love for Alex Nieto 
 
 Alejandro “Alex” Nieto, a San Francisco native and Mission District local, was shot and 
killed by four San Francisco police officers on March 21, 2014 at the bottom of Bernal Hill park. 
Alex was eating dinner at the park as he regularly did before work; Alex was a security guard at 
El Toro nightclub. A dog walker called 911 in complaint of a suspicious looking man who had a 
gun. What the witness saw was Nieto’s stun gun that he had permission to carry. Alex was leaving 
the park when four police officers were waiting for him at the bottom of Bernal Hill. In a short 
span of time, the situation escalated and the four officers drew their weapons and collectively fired 
58 shots at Alex, hitting him 15 times. Alex was 28 years old at the time of his death.  
On March 25, 2014, days after the shooting, Chief of Police Greg Suhr told ABC 7 News, 
“It’s an unbelievable tragedy, but I think the officers did what they felt they had to do.” District 
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Attorney George Gascon filed no charges against the four officers, calling the shooting “lawful 
and constitutional.”44 This statement represents the systematic support by law enforcement of a 
deeply questionable situation, which rallied a heavy uproar of protest from the community 
following the shooting. Given the many complexities of this story, it’s one that is familiar to most 
communities of color, in the sense there is a shared consensus that Alex didn’t have to die the way 
he did.  
The Nieto family filed a civil lawsuit. All four police officers who shot Nieto testified that 
he drew his weapon on them, causing them to be in fear of their lives. In court, it was the duty of 
the plaintiff to prove that the shooting was unjustified. What is a justifiable shooting in the eyes of 
the police department? Under Direct General Order 5.01 The Use of Force Directive, police 
officers are permitted to shoot a firearm, the highest level of use of force, if and when the officer 
feels his or her life and/or the lives of other civilians is in imminent danger.45 During the Nieto 
trial, the Nieto family’s attorney Adante Pointer challenged this idea of “feeling threatened” in 
court, he says, “You can’t say something’s a threat, it has to be credible threat, an imminent threat, 
is reasonable? An officer is not allowed to just say because someone is a threat that makes it a 
threat. So it has to be evaluated. Is that something that’s reasonable or credible or not.”46 According 
to the OCC openness report, all four officers stated this threat led them to draw their guns and 
ordered Nieto to show them his hands.47 The officers testified that Nieto aggressively walked 
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towards them, drew his Taser and yelled, “You show me your hands!,” and proceeded to get into 
a “weaver stance,” appearing like he was about to use his weapon.48 Although the police officers 
claim Nieto drew his weapon at them, not a single officer said they saw it fired, nor did any of the 
officers see Taser wires, blaming the wind for blowing away the evidence .49 Ultimately, there 
were more than a few reasons that made this OIS case questionable, questioning the evidence that 
led officers to feel “threatened” in a situation that lasted less than two minutes.  
The biggest shock in the Nieto trial came from a witness testimony that directly 
contradicted the testimony the four officers gave. Tim Redmond, reporter for 48 Hills, tells in an 
article on the Nieto trial that a new witness to the case, named Antonio Theodore, said that Nieto 
never drew a weapon, saw Nieto’s hands were in his pockets, and testified that he never heard the 
officers yell “show me your hands.”50 Theodore testified that the two officers who started the 
shooting opened fire after a one word warning, “stop” and continued to fire at Nieto after he was 
already on the ground. Antonio Theodore was the only other eyewitness to the shooting besides 
the police officers who shot Nieto, and while Theodore had no motive to lie in his testimony, the 
officers involved did. On March 10, 2016, a largely white, suburban jury found that the involved 
police officers acted properly and violated no policies in their encounter with Alex Nieto 
concluding the trial. 
A year has passed since the verdict and Alex Nieto’s death continues to serve as a major 
example of the wrongful deaths SFPD is responsible for. Before the final verdict of the trial was 
released, the then Office of Citizen Complaints completed their 20-page complaint summary report 
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on Alex Nieto’s death, initiated by a complaint that was filed by his father Refugio Nieto. In this 
report, the OCC cleared the officers involved from all the following allegations with the identified 
findings: 
• (#1-4) The officers used unnecessary force by discharging their firearms: Proper 
Conduct 
• (#5-8) The officers failed to properly investigate: Proper Conduct 
• (#9-12) The officers failed to take required actions: officers failed to recognize the 
decedent’s weapon as a Taser: Proper Conduct 
• (#13) Members of the San Francisco Police Department behaved inappropriately 
and made inappropriate comments: Not Sustained 
• (#14) The officer failed to take required action: Unfound 
• (#15) The officer searched the decedent’s room: Unfounded 
• (#16) The officer towed the decedent’s car without cause: Proper Conduct  
 
As the openness report shows, the OCC found that the four officers involved in Alex Nieto’s 
death did not violate any of their Direct General Orders and in some of these allegations, the OCC 
did not have enough evidence to determine otherwise, leaving all four officers to go on with their 
careers facing no forms of administrative discipline for what they did. A major criticism of the 
openness report that reflects a bigger flaw to the structure of OIS investigational operations lies in 
the fact that the OCC investigators did not include Antonio Theodore’s eyewitness testimony into 
their report. How could investigators leave out such a critical account to a “thorough” report? As 
I explained earlier on how the Department of Police Accountability investigates officer involved 
shootings, the DPA conducts their “independent” administrative investigations by conducting an 
independent review and analysis of evidence that is originally collected by the SFPD Homicide 
Detail, an internal agency to to police. This means the DPA investigators never actually collect 
evidence for themselves, they rely on the skills of the SFPD to investigate their own shooting 
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cases, which could cause room for suspicion and error by a police department who doesn’t want 
to be found guilty for breaking general orders. This is a one-way flow of information where 
investigators from the administrative investigation get all their information and evidence obtained 
from the criminal investigation, but the criminal investigation receives no information from the 
administrative investigation.51 All the questionable circumstances of evidence and the new 
eyewitness lawyer Adante Pointer brought out during the trail were not incorporated into the 
administrative investigation because none of that information was gathered by SFPD Homicide 
Detail, where the DPA received it’s investigatory sources. This investigatory protocol is limited to 
the administrative investigation because it actually ensures that the investigation not be 
independent at all, but rather dependent on whatever sources the SFPD gives the DPA to determine 
findings with. The reason for this investigatory protocol comes from a California government code 
that gives police officers due process protections against self-incrimination so that they may not 
be compelled by their employer to make “statements against their interest” as subjects of an 
administrative investigation.52 I will discuss this law in further detail later in the recommendations 
section, but as I have shown, this due process protection for police officers creates a questionable 
system in which administrative investigations are allowed to gather evidence. In the case of Alex 
Nieto, in which all trial evidence shows there was a believable chance officers acted against general 
orders, the evidence by which the DPA could make that call restricted them to say otherwise. 
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IV. Under the Microscope: Reform Efforts of the Department of Police Accountability  
 
In this section, I discuss San Francisco’s year of police department reform and highlight 
various methods the Police Commission used to both research and instill needed changes to the 
department. I analyze the recent reforms efforts to the DPA to show where recommendation reports 
and new policies fall short in administering real change and essentially perpetuate the same lack 
of discipline to police officers we’ve seen in past officer involved shooting cases. In light of 
scandals the San Francisco Police Department faced last year, these controversies sparked the 
major reform effort by the Police Commission to transform the department. This effort was seen 
in Mayor Ed Lee’s decision to appoint former Los Angeles Police Deputy Chief William “Bill” 
Scott as the new chief of the San Francisco Police Department. The former Chief Greg Surh, who 
served his position for 6 years, resigned after the death of Jessica Williams, a 29-year-old African 
American female who was shot in a car by police officers in the Bayview District. Surh faced 
community pressure to resign following the series of officer-involved shootings that year. Mayor 
Ed Lee and the Police Commission’s decision to bring in an “outsider” into the department was 
seen as an attempt to bring change and new way of thinking for a department that’s rooted in legacy 
and comradery around union membership. Chief Scott was sworn into his position in January 2017.  
In 2016, three external investigations were conducted around the policies and practices of 
the San Francisco Police Department. A federal investigation into our police department by the 
U.S Department of Justice evaluated the department as a whole, offering 272 federal 
recommendations aimed at reducing bias, improving accountability, and changing the department 
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culture through revamped hiring and training.53 The other two SFPD investigative reports done by 
the Blue Ribbon Task Force, a special task force compiled by the District Attorney, and the Civil 
Grand Jury, both give insight on how the SFPD truly operates around OIS cases in a way that 
needs an outside agency auditing it. Years of controversy that plagued the department led to the 
findings of these external investigations. I argue that although these external investigations did the 
City and County of San Francisco a huge justice in producing concise compilations of our 
shortcomings, the reform measures spurred from them still do not change the structures and laws 
that hinder the DPA authority in OIS investigations. Here, I discuss these reform measures to the 
DPA:  
 
Proposition D: San Francisco Citizen Complaints Office Investigations of Police Shootings 
 
 In June of 2016, San Francisco voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition D, a measure 
that was a direct response to community concerns around officer involved shootings. This measure 
changed the San Francisco charter to require the Department of Police Accountability to 
investigate every officer involved shooting and in custody deaths, instead of just shootings when 
a complaint is made. According to SPUR’s June 2016 election guide, Prop. D was placed on the 
ballot by four San Francisco supervisors at the height of public concern over use of force incidents 
by police officers – both nationally and locally.54 The SF Chronicle says it was DPA Director 
Joyce Hicks who worked closely with Supervisor Malia Cohen on the legislation, as a way to give 
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the DPA “a jump start on the most serious investigations”, instead of waiting days, or weeks to 
receive a complaint and then play “catch-up.”55 Supervisor Cohen spearheaded the ballot measure 
during election season, assuring voters that this process change would, “send a clear message to 
everyone near and far that we value transparency and accountability.”56  
Proposition D did not run into major opposition, even from the DPA’s longtime counter 
agency, the POA. In an interview with POA Director Marty Halloran discussing the Police 
Officer’s Association’s stance on Prop. D, he said, “We [the POA] did not support it nor did we 
oppose it. The POA has no problem with the DPA doing a full, independent investigation on any 
and all office involved shooting and in custody deaths.” Hallorin’s response to the measure calls 
into question the nature of it’s potential effect on OIS investigations. If no stakeholder is getting 
angry or passionate about the policy, then perhaps not much changes. The opinions against Prop. 
D said this measure could potentially create more paperwork for the DPA, which already has a 
large caseload. In 2016, the DPA investigated almost 700 cases, proving how busy the department 
really is.57 
Proposition D now requires for the DPA to be ready and prepared any moment an officer 
involved shooting happens. Now that the DPA is recognized as another agency fully participating 
and involved with the investigative processes for OIS cases, there are multiple factors to consider 
when trying to collect quality evidence. Barbara Attard says, “The OCC should now have someone 
on call to roll out to police shootings. They should be able to immediately take photographs and 
be there for the evidence collection. Protocols are needed for the OCC’s interview process with 
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the cops and if they’re going to be effective in investigating these cases, they’re going to need to 
train a bunch of people for that level of investigation.”58 This newfound authority truly calls for 
the DPA to revamp their protocols and reassess their resources.  
Overall, Prop. D gives the DPA a seat at the table. This measure gives the DPA a new 
responsibility to the people of San Francisco but ultimately, the policy does not address how 
evidence is collected by the homicide unit and internal affairs unit. There are multiple bodies 
involved with OIS initial investigation processes but the policies that determine who these agencies 
are do not shape what happens after the investigation, in terms of what the DPA does with their 
findings.  
 
The Zisser Report 
 
In light of overall SFPD reform, the Department of Police Accountability also initiated a 
review effort to evaluate their current agency operations. The DPA hired Aaron Zisser, a former 
U.S Department of Justice trial lawyer to author an internal review of OCC policies and practices 
and provide recommendations for improvements in their investigation process.59 In the report, 
Zisser says, “In order to fulfill its crucial oversight role, OCC must ensure that its heretofore 
primary tool – investigations – is working effectively, honestly, and transparently,” although the 
report does not specify what types of investigations he refers to, misconduct or officer involved 
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shooting, it is safe to assume Zisser is discussing “all of the above” investigations.60 The “Zisser 
Report” offers four broad recommendations on how to better the DPA. The recommendations 
below fall into the following broad categories: 
1. The evidentiary standard and weighing evidence, including assessing witness credibility 
(policy and training) 
2. Investigative techniques and procedures, including planning, interviews, and timeliness 
(policy and training) 
3. Supervision, attorney roles, and quality assurance 
4. Resources, including case assignments and technology 
 
Evaluating recommendation 1, related to weighing evidence, Zisser addresses the ways the 
DPA weighs its evidence to determine possible findings between “Not Sustained,” “Unfounded,” 
and “Proper Conduct.” He advises and critiques their usage of “he-said/she-said” evidence to make 
determinants in misconduct investigations as inappropriate rationale on which to base findings.61 
Recommendation 2, related to basic investigation techniques, calls out the DPA’s lack of actual 
“field work” during investigations, advising that the agency should practice stronger techniques in 
their collection of necessary materials and interviews. Overall, the Zisser report did not specifically 
mention any opinion on the current DPA approach to officer involved shooting investigations. 
Although this report is insightful and addresses ways the DPA can tighten up their investigation 
procedures, there was no specificity on OIS investigations that could have helped the agency 
brainstorm new tactics to investigate given their new authority from Prop. D. 	  
 
 
Prop G 
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 The approval of Proposition G marked a change in the operations of the then Office of 
Citizen Complaints, as a modestly helpful reform that would give slightly more independence to 
the oversight agency. The measure passed in the November 2016 election and officially renamed 
the Office of Citizen Complaints to the Department of Police Accountability. Changing the agency 
from an office to a whole department was an aspect of the measure that kept the name up to date 
with it’s newly granted authority in OIS cases. Prop. G also amended the charter so that the DPA 
has authority to audit any SFPD policy, procedure or practice.62 It also makes it so that the DPA 
now has direct authority over its proposed budget to the mayor. The measure was not controversial 
in San Francisco, nor did groups like the POA oppose it. While these changes brought the DPA to 
voter attention, none of these new changes directly effect the structures and laws that hinder DPA 
officer involved shooting investigations, making the measure ineffective in brining about change 
to this focus.  
   
 
Summary  
 
This project has shown the development of civilian oversight in the context of the San 
Francisco Police Department’s legacy of discretionary policing practices. By examining the ways 
in which the Department of Police Accountability is structured to conduct investigations of officer 
involved shootings, we’ve seen how the DPA is limited in what they may actually be able to 
determine in these investigations. This proved true in the highly questionable and controversial 
case of Alex Nieto. In a year long effort to change the regulated procedures that breed a toxic 
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policing culture, the Police Department created charter amendments effecting the DPA in hopes 
of stronger oversight. As I have shown, Prop D. and Prop. G will not create change in the officer 
involved shooting investigative process and ultimately, San Francisco will continue down a path 
of no administrative accountability for it’s police officers when necessary. I propose ideas to 
address this problem by tackling state laws and our local approach to civilian oversight.  
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V. Recommendations 
 
In this section, I present four different recommendations that would change current state 
laws and the San Francisco charter which directly interferes with the authoritative power and 
investigatory proceedings of the Department of Police Accountability. As my paper has shown, 
the work that DPA does related to OIS investigations has failed to make an impact in San 
Francisco’s belief of the organization. Following the implementation of Proposition D in June 
2016, the Department of Police Accountability is now in a position to add investigative input that 
could potentially bring social justice in OIS cases on behalf of the San Francisco civilians they 
serve, if they are able to produce quality, sustain-worthy findings from OIS cases and if they are 
able to actually do something with these findings. Here, I argue that there are certain laws and 
policies in place that must be reformed in order to ensure the DPA has complete access, ability 
and authority to perform their duties to the best of their abilities. These policies are the Peace 
Officer’s Bill of Rights, the Copley Press Decision and the San Francisco Charter’s section on the 
Department of Police Accountability. 
 
The Peace Officers Bill of Rights 
 
In 14 states across the country, police officers are given a set legal protections meant to 
protect all American law enforcement personnel from investigations and prosecution for conduct 
while they are acting on duty. This body of rights is called the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of 
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Rights (LEOBR) but more commonly known as the Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBR).63 The 
Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights functions as a set of due process rights for police officers under 
investigation for all forms of alleged misconduct. The Huffington Post tells the history of the Peace 
Officers Bill of Rights’ emergence in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a reactionary effort to 
combat the demands of civil rights activists who called for greater police accountability and 
spurred the creation of citizen review boards as discussed earlier.64 In two rulings in 1967 and 
1968, the Supreme Court sided with police officers who claimed they had been deprived of their 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.65 Following these cases, the justices ruled police 
officers may not be forced (by threat of termination) to testify against themselves, including during 
internal, administrative investigations.66  
In 1976, California Governor Jerry Brown signed California’s version of the bill into 
power, calling it the Public Safety Officer’s Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Section 3300-3312 of 
the government code. The California Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights lists detailed sections of what 
sorts of protections cops have, relating to the following: representation in investigation 
interrogation, inspection of personnel files, locker searching, etc.67 Section 3303, titled 
“Investigation interrogations; conduct; conditions; representation; reassignment”, declares that 
whenever a public safety officer is under investigation and subjected to interrogation by any 
member of the public safety department that could potentially lead to punitive action, the 
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interrogation must legally happen under ten descriptive conditions. Some of these conditions 
include holding the interrogation at a “reasonable hour” preferably when the office is on duty, if it 
is done when the officer is off duty then the officer must be compensated for off duty time. 
Interrogation conditions for officers also include assurance that the officer knows what they are 
being investigated about prior to the meeting. This is one example of the sorts of “catering” like 
treatment the POBR ensures for officers who are under investigation for in some cases, very 
serious crimes.  
 In San Francisco, the Police Officers Association uses the Peace Officers Bill of Rights as 
its protective weaponry during accusations of misconduct. In an interview, POA President 
Halloran explained how the POA uses the Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights during cases in which 
they must represent officers from punitive action, which can mean suspension and or loss of pay.68 
The POA represents its members for internal affairs investigations, DPA investigations, and will 
represent officers in any form of hearings before the Police Commission. Hallorin says, “Through 
the POA, officers under investigation are given defense representatives, who are fellow police 
officers that defend and represent accused police officers in front of the oversight bodies listed 
above. For high profile cases like OIS, the POA will bring in attorneys to counsel accused officers 
as the peace officers bill of rights under Section 3303 subdivision (i) legally allows.”69 Unions 
exist to protect their members as the POA has proved time and time again, they aggressively use 
the POBR to ensure their members’ privacy and protection during officer involved shooting 
investigations.  
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More than 35 years after its inception, the law continues to create a nearly impenetrable 
wall that restricts public access to police disciplinary records and civilian complaints in California, 
as we’ve seen in the DPA’s vague openness reports. These openness reports are conducted as a 
method of transparency but because of the POBR, the reports say nothing about which officers are 
being accused of misconduct. The Peace Officer Bill of rights makes officer personnel records 
confidential, including records of promotions and of course discipline records and any other 
information that would release an “unwanted invasion of personal privacy.”70 The problem with 
the PBOR is that it works as an invisible force field for civilian oversight agencies like the DPA. 
These restrictions to police information perpetuate distrust in police, we see this example following 
Alex Nieto’s death in which case community activists demanded the names of the officers who 
shot Nieto but were denied this information for months on end.  
I recommend that the state legislators repeal the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights entirely, 
unless there is an agreement to reform it in a way that allows more information to be made public 
during officer investigation. As discussed earlier, administrative investigation may only use 
evidence and information from criminal investigations to support their own. This due process 
protection is because of the Peace Officers Bill of Rights. The Police Officers Bills of Rights works 
to dismantle necessary information for investigative personnel in civilian oversight to conduct 
thorough research and investigation needed to provide charges that are upheld by the Police 
Commission. This law shapes the structure of investigation so that administrative investigators are 
left at the mercy of criminal investigators’ evidence, which in San Francisco is headed by the SFPD 
leaving more than enough room for conflicts of interest. This law is deeply flawed and is the direct 
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reason why officers face no administrative accountability for their actions after officer involved 
shooting investigations.  
 
Copley Press vs. Supreme Court  
  
The Peace Officers Bill of Rights is not the only California law that works to protect police 
officer rights in instances of officer investigations and review. The 2006 state Supreme Court 
ruling known as the “Copley decision” is another major California policy that directly affects the 
information civilian oversight agencies are allowed to see. According to The San Diego Union 
Tribune, Copley Press  sought access to a disciplinary hearing in which a San Diego County deputy 
sheriff was appealing his termination from the force.71 The Supreme Court ruled that police 
disciplinary hearings are closed and the public has no right to learn about allegations against police 
officers for police misconduct, even when they are discussed in a civil service commission. The 
Copley Press ruling “has effectively shut off all avenues for the public to learn about misconduct 
involving individual police officers, such as excessive force and dishonesty; officer involved 
shootings; patterns of misconduct and leniency; previous discipline for misconduct by another 
agency; and even the identity of officers in misconduct cases,” according to the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Northern California.72 
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ACLUNC sources say before Copley Press was decided, Penal Code 832.7 prevented 
public access to citizen complaints held by an officer’s employing agency, meaning internal affairs 
records were confidential, while records of administrative appeals to outside bodies like the Police 
Commission and the OCC were open to the public.73 In San Francisco before 2006, Police 
Commission records were open to the public, allowing people to learn about serious misconduct 
cases ranging from excessive force to dishonesty. But after Copley Press, all hearings and related 
records are no longer released.74 This is an issue for San Francisco civilian review because the 
denial of access to officer information has created a major issue of transparency between SFPD 
and the general public which the DPA has no authority to change. The purpose of the DPA’s 
openness reports is to clearly communicate with the public the investigations and findings of all 
misconduct cases, including summaries of serious offences like officer involved shootings. 
Because of the Copley Press ruling, the openness reports are written in a “general language” format 
that excludes names of officers, keeping officer information private. For example, if an officer has 
prior offenses/records for shooting incidents, that information is kept from the public. 
 In 2016, Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco) introduced Senate Bill 1286, which would 
have allowed the public access to internal reports in cases where police departments found officers 
committed misconduct offenses, including investigations of officer involved shootings.75 This was 
a direct attempt to combat the Copley decision but unfortunately, the measure died shortly after it 
was proposed. I recommend efforts to either propose a similar Senate bill or to lead a stronger 
campaign to overturn the Copley Press decision. Overturning the Copley Decision is necessary in 
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a time of nation wide police reform because it shows citizens that the police responsible for 
policing their communities have nothing to hide. It would work as beginning steps to break down 
barriers between communities and police with historic legacies of mistrust not only in San 
Francisco, but throughout California. 
 
  
	   45	  
The City and County of San Francisco Charter amendment  
 
My third recommendation to improve the Department of Police Accountability lies in the 
structural workings of the City and County of San Francisco’s Charter. The Department of Police 
Accountability’s authoritative power is detailed in the City Charter under Section 4.136. This 
includes the structural descriptions of what the DPA is and is not allowed to do. As my project has 
shown, the DPA routinely makes recommendations to the chief of police all the time that he 
doesn’t follow. In an interview with Police Commissioner Sonia Malera, she said, “I’ve seen a 
couple [sustained findings] in which the chief did not carry out recommendations, so they were 
brought to the commission level and I still didn’t think they were that big and when they were 
brought before us they didn’t meet the criteria, now that they are an independent body they might 
push more through.”76 How will OIS investigations be different? When speaking to Director Joyce 
Hicks about the process of an OIS, she revealed that the way it works now will more than likely 
remain the same.77 Now that the DPA is responsible for investigation more serious crimes, there 
should be no way that the Police Chief can try to negotiate out of discipline in the death of a 
civilian. These findings must go to the Police Commission in all instances. 
I recommend this section of the charter be reformed to allow the Director of the DPA to 
directly issue disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commission in cases of officer involved 
shootings. After the passage of Prop. D, there is still no amended protocol for what the 
recommendation process will look like in an officer involved shooting investigation. I recommend 
that in the case of officer involved shooting sustained findings, the DPA Director should be given 
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full authority to directly file charges with the Police Commission, excluding the Police Chief from 
this negotiation. There should be a new, special section of the city charter that creates a new 
protocol between the Police Commission and the Department of Police Accountability to review 
sustained findings independently and then hold hearings with the officers involved and the chief 
to administer discipline. There needs to be a charter assurance for findings in OIS cases that does 
not allow these cases to be handled or absolved in a single meeting between DPA director and 
chief of police. A new measure must be created to ensure the charter upholds a process for OIS 
case discipline. I believe that is true civilian oversight of policing, when civilian members are able 
to determine how to reprimand the police department, this will be the beginning of police reform 
in San Francisco.  
 
Department of Police Accountability Executive Director  
 
The head of a department sets the tone for the whole agency. This proves true for 
Department of Police Accountability. During Joyce Hicks nine-year term as DPA Director, there 
was not a single sustained finding charge against police officers involved in an officer involved 
shooting. Although this project shows how structurally and legally, evidence to support these 
charges can be difficult to obtain, the power of political will also plays a huge role in how far a 
case can go. The city charter allows the DPA Director to file charges with the Police Commission 
if and when they feel its review for discipline is needed, even if the Police Chief decided it isn’t. 
The DPA needs a director who isn’t afraid to upset people, specifically the Police Officers 
Association. Before Joyce Hicks there was Mary Dunlap, a highly regarded civil rights attorney 
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appointed of the OCC by past Mayor Willie Brown.78 Dunlap was known for rejuvenating the 
oversight agency with her strong leadership and high standard of professionalism. She was a 
director who regularly challenged the chief of police and the POA in her commitment to making 
the OCC an advocacy agency for citizens’ rights. Dunlap died in 2003 and since her passing, the 
DPA has not had a director with the same level of aggression. Joyce Hicks’s retirement leaves an 
important opening for the DPA, one that will determine the future of police accountability in San 
Francisco for years to come.  
I recommend that the same ways in which the Police Commission and Mayor Ed Lee 
sought an “outsider” to serve as new chief of police, the Department of Police Accountability 
should bring in an executive director with no previous connection the the San Francisco Police 
Department. By bringing someone from outside of San Francisco to head the DPA with a strong 
background working in civilian oversight. San Francisco needs a new Department head who will 
not be afraid of challenging the Police Officers Association by taking charges directly to the Police 
Commission in cases of blatant misconduct and lethal use of force.  
 
VI. Conclusion and Analytical Reflection  
 
We are at a critical point in the story of American policing. Today more than ever, younger 
generations of informed voters are becoming involved in activism around police brutality and 
police reform. This newfound attention to policing practices allows all cities to begin to ask their 
own police departments, what are we doing to perpetuate the narrative of policing? In San 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Henry K Lee. “Mary Dunlap – S.F police watchdog, rights advocate,” SF Gate, January 22, 
2003, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Mary-Dunlap-S-F-police-watchdog-rights-
2638828.php.	  	  
	   48	  
Francisco, the outrageous amount of officer involved shootings and lack our accountability for 
them gives us our answer. Today, it is absolutely necessary for civilian oversight agencies to have 
full authoritative powers in order to combat this epidemic.  
 In San Francisco, the general public has little to no faith in the Department of Police 
Accountability for good reasons. The DPA continues to prove to our local communities that its 
priorities lie in generating timely reports rather than challenging the Chief of Police. The purpose 
of my project was to show where the structural limitations exist and how the DPA can combat 
them. Local residents’ frustration with the DPA comes from a lack of understanding in how these 
policies and power structures work together to create a “perfect storm” for police officers to face 
little to no discipline in cases of officer involved shootings. Cases like Alex Nieto’s death fuel 
organizing efforts and activism around police brutality in San Francisco, echoing demands for 
justice from the courts. Although administrative charges don’t hold the same effect as sending a 
police officer to jail for murder, I do think the act of career discipline for officers sends a message 
to police that government agencies are meant to protect civilians, not cops.   
I believe we are on the dawn of a new era for the San Francisco Police Department. The 
reform efforts of 2016 successfully captured city wide attention on SFPD, we are at a point where 
their every move is being watched. The open director position at the Department of Police 
Accountability stirs concerns for the future but a stronger hope as to what this future can look like. 
This open position has the potential to be filled by a successor that can continue the DPA down 
the current path it’s been on, or if chosen wisely, can make the oversight agency stronger than it’s 
ever been before. I believe we have the information on what needs to be changed in the San 
Francisco Police Department, locally and state wide. All we need now is the political will to 
implement these changes.  
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My interest in the San Francisco Police Department began this summer during my 
internship with 48 Hills, a San Francisco independent media publication. As an intern, it was my 
responsibility to stay up to date with local politics and the latest San Francisco news. Watching 
debates and going to protests was exciting for me. This internship gave me a rush because I was 
able to personally observe stories and interactions between citizens and policymakers unfold 
before my eyes. During July of 2016, after the release of the Blue Ribbon Panel report, my 
supervisor Tim Redmond released an article that gave summary of the panel debriefing which 
captured the animosity felt between departments. This research triggered questions I had about our 
huge police department and police policies that come into play during in officer involved 
shootings.  
My internship at 48 hills gave me an understanding of what it takes to be an effective 
reporter. Being a reporter requires the ability to synthesize a billion bits of information at once and 
be able to tell the story of what’s really happening in your community. I learned that there will be 
groups of people who disagree with how you tell the story but that’s okay because there are always 
multiple sides to a story and they all deserve to be told. In the case of the San Francisco Police 
Department, I kept up to date with all the reform efforts of 2016 in search of bits of information 
that didn’t look right. In this process, I grew curious of the Office of Citizen’s Complaints. I didn’t 
understand how the police department could get away with so much if we had an agency that was 
supposed to handle discipline. Trying to understand who the OCC was and what purpose they 
filled was the starting point of my research. 
During my internship experience, I also realized how much I enjoyed interviewing people. 
I wanted to incorporate this method into how I gathered information for my project in order to 
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personally meet those I’m writing about. Interviewing a variety of key players from my project 
helped me develop a better narrative how the issue of police discipline is playing out in San 
Francisco. Meeting the heads of who decides what happens after a tragic situation gave me a 
different perspective on understanding how city policies are carried out by people. People are the 
ones who make policies real and meeting the leaders who carry out police department policies was 
very impactful for me and my research.  
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